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Abstract. On the whole, the co-evolutionary literature on state-business relationships in Russia con-
veys the idea that signi!cant changes have occurred in property and corporate governance while less 
change is noticed in management structures, and workplaces are the places less touched by the systemic 
transformation. "is paper critically assesses the idea that organizational changes only proceed #om 
top to down and #om the outside to the inside: those who interact in the workplace are not just the re-
ceiving end of change. Yet, the cognitive lenses through which this area of empirical reality is seen have 
o$en led to the superposition on shop-%oor accounts of overarching #ameworks such as that of surplus 
value extraction and the class antagonism it is bound to breed. I argue that be&er ways to bridge the 
micro-macro gap may be found within an institutional research that highlights the links between the 
microlevel of !rm capacities for change and the meso level of organizational !elds and local socioins-
titutional environments. "erefore, the paper reviews some major contributions of the co-evolutionary 
#amework with a focus on the bridging issue of emerging entrepreneurship. "en it addresses the met-
hodological challenge of devising explanatory mechanisms that might improve our understanding of 
that issue. Two examples are proposed here for a comparative look at the Russian case: the a&ention 
for the “strategies of  independence” of working people in classic works of industrial sociology as well as 
for the “social construction of markets” as aggregate outcome of such strategies in the Italian  industrial 
districts. "e paper concludes with some remarks on whether a rational model of purposive action is 
or is not compatible with thick descriptions and high-context explanations of the micro-meso link.
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Introduction
!e most complete set of case studies on post-soviet factory regime is probably that 
carried out by Simon Clarke and his group on Russian enterprises in the early stage of 
transition (Clarke, 1996) and the period 2003-2005 (Clarke, 2007). In his essay on “!e 
Soviet descent into capitalism”, Michael Burawoy (1997) reviews the "rst wave of such 
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studies and poses the following question. What are the speci"cities of all those informal 
structures that persist today and reproduce many features of the previous factory regime? 
!ese shop-#oor accounts, he aptly notes, are akin to the classic studies of American 
industrial sociology of the 1950s of which Gouldner’s Pa&erns of Industrial Bureaucracy 
(1954, <1970>) was one of the best examples. And similar also are their shortcomings 
for “they tend to isolate the shop #oor and downplay the very external forces that produce 
its distinctiveness”. In short, they neglect the fact that all those informal relations (Gould-
ner’s mock bureaucracy) are a reply and a compensation of sorts to “the unintended conse-
quences of a rationality imposed from above” (Burawoy, 1997, p. 1437). 
!e end result of all those “improvisations” on the soviet shop #oor, and of manage-
ment-labour collusion in front of higher authorities, was a strong collectivism which 
lingers on the post-Soviet labour process (Burawoy & Krotov, 1992; Clarke, 1996a, 
1996b, 2004, 2007). !e point then is: how can we explain both the persistence of fac-
tory paternalism and organizational changes in the face of “an ascendant market econo-
my” whereby the hollowing out of enterprise welfare is going along with radical changes 
in the spheres of distribution and consumption? Burawoy concludes that an alternative 
explanation to Clarke’s cultural continuity is needed which, strangely enough, resonates 
with the neoliberal vision of Russian factories as “bastions of irrational conservatism” 
(Burawoy, 1997, p. 1438).
!e case studies carried out by Burawoy, Clarke and their associates have yielded an 
in-depth knowledge of production management and the social structure of enterprises. 
Yet, their a$empts to link the microlevel of shop-#oor accounts to the macrolevel of 
capitalist development in Russia leave the micro-macro gap wide open. !e idea that 
prompted this paper is that be$er ways do exist to bridging the gap than that of linking 
shop-#oor accounts to law-like statements on the extraction of surplus value and the 
class antagonism it is bound to breed. !e argument put forward here shares the view 
that the cognitive lenses through which we look at the co-evolution of organizations 
and institutions in Russia may be sharpened by rereading the classic works of American 
industrial sociology. And also shares the view that Russian factories are not necessarily 
bastions of conservatism. What is not shared is the overarching Marxist framework that 
has been superimposed on all those shop #oor accounts. !en, the qualitative hypoth-
esis is that the research issues quoted above call for the application of mid-level explana-
tory mechanisms to the spatial-temporal variability of the links between organizational 
capacities for change, corporate management and institutional pressures. 
!e paper is structured as follows. In section one, an old lesson from the study on 
work and authority in soviet industry by Reinhard Bendix is being recalled to exemplify 
the kind of useful explanatory mechanisms we can retrieve from the classics of indus-
trial sociology. !e lesson is that organizational change may be brought about not only 
by collective action: individual “strategies of independence” can also have a ‘subversive’ 
impact within and among organizations. 
Section two refers to some central contributions of the literature to state-business 
relationships which investigate continuities and in#ection points in the coevolution of 
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organizational and institutional change in transition economies. Here the focus is on 
how organizations reject old rules, develop new capabilities and make strategic choices 
to cope with the uncertainty of markets brought about by the regulative pillar of the 
dirigiste state. 
Section three brings in the local dimension into the co-evolutionary framework, and 
takes an unusual comparator such as the Italian case to rethink how the bridging issue 
is dealt with in the co-evolutionary framework. Section four discusses implications for 
further research on the reciprocal in#uences of microlevel organizational processes and 
mesolevel changes in the organizational "eld and the local environment. Section "ve 
concludes with some thoughts on an issue in need of further elaboration: the alleged 
contradiction between high-context explanations of the micro-meso link and the ra-
tional model of purposive action.
1. A reminder on soviet management: back to Reinhard Bendix 
!e picture of soviet management and labour relations that emerge from the case stud-
ies of Clarke and his associates may be summarized as follows. Soviet enterprises always 
tried to negotiate higher amounts of inputs to produce not only for the plan, but also 
for their own needs: machinery in short supply, goods for local consumption, housing 
in the company town, welfare provisions and cultural facilities. !is tendency to the 
maximization of production costs was not economic irrationality. Rather, it was “a drain 
on the surplus to the bene"t of the needs of the direct producers, a subversion of the 
system of surplus appropriation“ (Clarke, 2007, p. 22).  
All this was framed in a conception of the labour collective as both a unit of production 
and the basic cell of the soviet society responsible for the social and cultural reproduction 
of the labour force. Clarke de"nes the soviet variant of corporate culture as a blend of 
“authoritarian paternalism” and “alienated collectivism”. !e "rst term is used to denote 
the concern of management for its subordinates expressed in cultural events, welfare pro-
visions, but also a concern for the subordinates’ personal problems expressed in informal 
relations. !e second term refers to a collectivism which was merely ideological in that 
the kollektiv was seen by its members “not as a means of their self-expression, but as an 
overarching force to which they were subordinate” (Clarke, 2007, p. 47).
Finally, Clarke sees the changes before the transition crisis again in terms of contra-
dictions in the system of surplus appropriation brought about by the partial opening 
of the soviet economy to the world markets. At the macro level, the reforms should 
have encouraged the development of the force of production, but once under way, they 
acquired a dynamic of their own. Why, he asks, should enterprises keep going with the 
delivering of state orders when they could sell more pro"table at market prices? And 
at the micro level, why the money in the pockets of workers should not lubricate the 
black market and foster the production of their family plots? !e a$empts of economic 
reforms were not a sign of basic change in the system, but rather the means by which 
change was constantly postponed (Clarke, 2007, pp. 13-15). 
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In his review essay, Burawoy provided a good insight when he pointed to the missed 
opportunity for Clarke to make a link between his analysis and that of “Communist 
Neotraditionalism” on the historical roots of workers’ organized dependency from the 
factory welfare (Walder, 1986).  Yet, neither he nor Clarke asked themselves what in-
dividual workers might decide when they came up to realize that such dependence was 
not so rewarding. !e only options for workers they both consider were: looking for a 
be$er workplace, becoming members of the core group of ‘activists’ to improve their lot 
with the ‘social salary’ or using their capacity of improvisation on the job to bargaining 
for higher compensation with foremen and shop chiefs (Clarke et al., 1996; Burawoy, 
1997; Clarke, 2007).  
!ere really was more than that in soviet factories, and there also was more in their 
company towns than subbotniki or tilling in private plots (Grancelli, 1988). To under-
stand this, a version of Communist Neotraditionalism neglected by Burawoy is more 
suitable to understand workers’ options. But before referring to it, we would be$er re-
call the methodological tool that Reinhard Bendix (1956 <1970>) used in his classic 
comparative look into the ideology and practices of soviet management. 
Bendix pointed to the stretching of command chains in big Western corporations 
as the cause of some delegation of authority to the intermediate levels of management. 
!e intent of the Human Relations School was precisely that of ensuring the right use 
of discretion at these levels thus running the risk of a$aching excessive importance to 
work in groups to the detriment of individual autonomy. However, exchanges of ideas, 
pa$erns of leadership, and consensus on the performance criteria also foster individual 
“strategies of independence” in the organizations they belong to, with or without sup-
port from the work team. Bendix warned against the risk of “managerial collectivism” 
which may stem from an excess of emphasis on working in groups and on work as sym-
bol of loyalty toward the enterprises. In democratic societies, that form of collectivism 
is thwarted by other loyalties (the unions, for instance), and various pa$erns of infor-
mal relations on the shop #oor. However, the risk has become real in the soviet form 
of subordination. A form aimed at the elimination of all strategies of independence by 
two basic mechanisms: double hierarchy within the industrial bureaucracy (party and 
factory administration), and separation of “activists” from the rest of work collectives. 
(Bendix, 1970, p. 425).
Work ethics, in the Soviet context, was not the outcome of an evolving discourse on 
the authority of managers and entrepreneurs as it was in the West. Rather, it was the result 
of “material” and “moral” incentives allocated by the factory administration in coopera-
tion with the union commi$ee. It also was the outcome of vertical and horizontal controls 
in a framework of ”institutionalized suspicion”. All this in substantial continuity with the 
paternalistic practices of the last years of the autocratic government which was revealed, 
for instance, in  the role of  trade union as ideological educator of working people and 
political “transmission belt” of central authorities (Bendix, 1970, p.  427).
Continuities in the factory paternalism bring about the reproduction of strategies 
based on personal convenience, given the persisting impossibility of collective action 
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in defence of labour’s interests. Bendix does not see such strategies as unintended con-
sequences of a rationality imposed from above, as Buravoy does. Rather he sees them as 
ways to somewhat coping with the irrational requests put down on working people by a 
factory regime whereby economic rationality was eclipsed by the quantitative principle 
of production. 
!at lesson has been learned by scholars who explained the organized dependence 
of workers through the factory welfare (Walder, 1986). But it was also learned by schol-
ars who traced back the development of the shadow economy to the corruption of a 
Leninist regime whereby many cadres turned into local bosses that gave an interested 
protection to the motley crew engaged in the sub-institutional reconstruction of mar-
kets under the socialist facade ( Jowi$, 1983; Mars & Altman, 1983). And "nally, the 
lesson has also been learned by scholars who focused on the opportunities for indi-
vidual strategies of independence that opened up whenever the directive bureaucracy 
turned into a Gouldnerian “mock bureaucracy”, especially in the organizational envi-
ronment of low priority enterprises (Stark, 1989; Grancelli, 1988, 1995).
2. Business-state relationships: continuities and in!ection points
!e co-evolution of "rm strategies and state policies in the transition economy is not a 
linear process for it is characterized by the coexistence of path dependency and path gen-
eration both in a changing institutional environment and in the management of produc-
tion (Schwartz & McCann, 2007). A detailed review of the co-evolutionary perspective is 
beyond the scope of this article whose aim is just to provide further insights on the bridg-
ing issues at the micro-meso level of the organization and its local environment. What is 
important, then, is to recall the basics of Russian business and its evolution as they emerge 
in some central contributions on the external constraints arising in the process of transi-
tion and the internal forces promoting or inhibiting organizational change.
!e outline of organization-environment co-evolution presented here follows the 
format proposed by Sheila Pu/er and Daniel McCarthy (2011) who organized their re-
view around three issues. First, the “environment question” which they refer to culture, 
institutions and state policies. Second, the “bridging question” which involves corpo-
rate governance and the strategic choices of di/erent type of enterprises. !ird, the “or-
ganizational question” related to "rms’ capacities for change with a focus on leadership 
and knowledge management. In this scheme I include just a few of the issues Pu/er and 
McCarthy gather under the three headings. However, I include something they chose 
not to review, namely, the issue of emerging entrepreneurship with a speci"c reference 
to the Russian case.
2.1.  On the environmental (macro-) issue. 
!e environmental question is summarized by Pu/er and McCarthy in terms of a per-
sisting scant legitimacy of formal institutions that brings about a vicious circle of cultural 
path dependency. Economic actors tend to resort to familiar pa$erns in organizational 
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processes such leadership and knowledge management; these models reproduce con-
tinuities in the bridging mechanisms between organization and the environment that 
result in low transparency in corporate government and limited competitive capacity of 
strategies. !e end result is the perpetuation of an “institutional void” along with the 
dependency from cultural-cognitive informal institutions (blat+networks+corruption) 
by the management of enterprises. In short, the void of market-supporting institutions 
is still "lled with a networking based on cultural traditions of the country by a col-
lectivist-paternalist leadership usually unable to develop resources for innovation and 
competition (Pu/er et al., 2009; Pu/er & McCarthy, 2011).
!e macro approach known as a “variety of capitalism” also yields signi"cant results 
on the state-business relationship that can be summarized as follows. First, business ac-
tors tend to adapt to the systemic transformation through the use of skills, templates and 
existing networks insofar as the insertion into the world market has come about only for 
the strategic sectors and the big holdings while the isolation of the rest of the economy 
has hindered the modernization of production processes. Second, signi"cant changes are 
going on in property and business strategies; some changes are also occurring in manage-
ment structures and systems of control. Li$le change may instead be noticed in the shop-
#oor and work organization (Schwartz & McCann, 2007; Martin, 2007).
2.2. On the organizational issue.
According to Klaus Meyer and Mike Peng (2005), the study of organizational transac-
tions with institutions, in the volatile environment of transition economies, must have 
backdrop approaches, such as resource dependence or dynamic capabilities, that can 
drive institutionalism into a “back-to-roots movement” of sorts to regain its concentra-
tion on intra-organizational issues. Following this clue, we present here a review of case 
studies (carried out in Russia in the "rst decade of the 2000s) that try to explain the 
lingering of soviet-type managerial practices in incumbent "rms.
Simon Clarke draws two main conclusions from the second wave of case studies he 
had coordinated. !e "rst is that subordination to capital through the rule of money did 
not bring about a signi"cant impact on organizational practices and procedures. What 
happened in the "rst stage of transformation was indeed that "rms were merely engaged 
in survival while the opportunities of integration into global markets were seized by 
commercial intermediaries. !e second conclusion is that not even the recovery from 
the "nancial collapse of 1998 brought about marked improvement in corporate govern-
ance, accounting and legal practices. !e adoption of international practices, he claims, 
is li$le more than window dressing, and the scarce development of appropriate man-
agement practices proves that capital has found various barriers to its penetration into 
production (Clarke, 2007, pp. 19-20). 
!ese conclusions stem from a set of shop-#oor accounts in "rms incorporated in 
holdings, independent "rms and new private enterprises. As for personnel manage-
ment, the main actors still appear to be middle line managers and foremen that are 
seldom integrated into the managerial hierarchy. !e pay systems keep being based on 
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low o=cial salaries plus additional payments in cash. !at should provide incentives 
for workers to overcome the limitations of technology and the disorganization of pro-
duction management, in the belief that will power can overcome objective constraints 
(Clarke, 2007, p. 188). 
In his conclusions, Clarke highlights three points. First, independent enterprises must 
still follow the imperative of survival; they may have harnessed soviet practices in the new 
environment, but they do so with a wearing human and material base. Second, the new 
private sector does not provide a sustainable base for and alternative variety of capitalism 
either: these "rms have found market niches created by the in#exibility of trading "rms, 
and have recruited those who leQ old soviet factories, but this by no means guarantees a 
lower level of tensions (even if latent) between workers and managers. !ird, enterprises 
that belong to a holding present no synthesis between old and new: process and product 
innovation are at an early stage, "nancial centralization goes along with decentralization 
of managerial responsibility in organizations in which changes proceed from the outside 
inwards, and from top to down. Finally, small and medium enterprises are working on the 
margin of legality, which seems to be the reason why they can sometimes be competitive 
within the new private sector (Clarke, 2007, p. 226).
!e use of inherited resources in management practices is also apparent in enter-
prises that recovered the high priority status as is demonstrated by an extensive longi-
tudinal survey carried out by Kosals and Izyumov (2011) in 50 Russian regions on a 
sample of "rms in the defence sector. !is investigation drew from the neoistitutionalist 
model that links the restructuring to both pre-existing social structures and norms, and 
the national-level institutional changes to highlight the path dependence and path gen-
eration in management and labour relations. 
!e high degree of path dependency in the defence industry is traced back to cen-
tralization and administrative rigidity, geographical isolation, secrecy and, most of all, 
the priority support granted again by the federal government. !e weakness of unions 
is less than a problem for workers since the safety nets provided by secondary income 
have never disappeared, labour market conditions are favourable, especially for quali-
"ed workers and, last but not least, something akin to the Soviet factory welfare could 
get back again aQer the hard ups of the 1990s (Kosals & Izyumov, 2011, p. 752).
Here we have spo$ed something like the bastions of conservatism, even if such con-
servatism looks not so irrational from the point of view of individual workers and the 
kollektiv. Actually, factory paternalism, and the a$endant organized dependency, may 
be seen as good value by workers of defence industries, especially so if individual strate-
gies of ge$ing secondary income keep being feasible. Nonetheless, a lingering Soviet 
management may also be observed in what once were the low priority sectors (textile, 
for example) that today are those in which the presence of "nancial-industrial groups 
is quite massive. 
!e entry of holdings into industrial production has been examined by Claudio 
Morrison (2007) in a case study in the textile sector of Ivanovo. Here the relationships 
between outside ownership and factory management have been addressed within the 
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framework of principal-agent. !e similarity of post-soviet practices to those of the ‘red 
directors’ is traced back not so much to the incapacity of a conservative management to 
catch market opportunities. Rather, they are ascribed to the policies of import substitu-
tions, and the choice of new owners to pursue an extensive growth based on low cost 
and low quality production associated with a policy of acquisitions and tax avoidance. 
Finally, the reproduction of old practices is put down to a rigid planning in organiza-
tional contexts in which the uncertainty to cope with is still largely on the input side, 
and production is usually far from the technological frontier. In this kind of kollektiv, 
traditional workers’ abilities keep being of much value and the opposition to any re-
structuring is well entrenched (Morrison, 2007).
Other studies in former SOEs highlight that forms of incremental innovation and 
search of new markets go along with a high degree of continuity in management and 
employment relations. As Vera Trappmann (2007) concludes in her case study in the 
steel giant of Magnitogorsk, the threat of unemployment fosters the acceptance of low 
wages in exchange for a relative security of employment which stems from the market 
success of the "rm. Workers remain highly dependent on their job positions “…as long 
as labour mobility is not regulated by external markets, but relies on informal good rela-
tions with companies.” Yet, in such politicized organizational se$ings the dependency 
of workers is not without returns insofar as their support has a weight in deciding who 
controls the "rm (Trappmann, 2007, p. 146). And it may also be that the recentraliza-
tion of government means (for those who control the "rm) the new blat and the cor-
rupt dealings associated with it turn again into “the competitive weapon number one.” 
If the know who becomes more important than the managerial know how, low competi-
tiveness and the freezing of strategic plans may be among the likely outcomes (May & 
Ledgerwood, p. 2007).
2.3. On the bridging issue
Inherited resources of incumbents are still important in the transition. However, in 
a context in which institutions are more than background conditions, the success or 
survival of enterprises more and more depends on their capacity to combine new and 
inherited resources. !e available evidence on the bridging issue shows that strategies 
are put into use to cope as much as with the lack of market-supporting institutions as 
with the imperfection of a domestic market in which competition is thwarted by a high 
degree of monopolization, entry barriers, regional segmentation and the speci"cities 
of the vertical integration (Peng, 2003; Meyer & Peng, 2005; Avdasheva et al., 2007; 
Kuznetsov, 2011). 
!e persistence of network strategies as functional substitutes of market-supporting 
institutions is understandable if we bear in mind that the prevailing reaction to compe-
tition has taken the form of holdings, acquisition of wider shares of regional markets, 
and manipulation of the value chain even if the main obstacle to competition remains 
the insu=cient legal de"nition of property rights (Avdasheva, 2007; Gurkov, 2011). 
But not all is bad news for a certain increase in competition is emerging in Russia which 
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brings with it more incentives to process and product innovation (Kuznetsov et al., 
2011). !ese signs of change, however weak, should not be neglected.
Networking with institutional actors is the prevailing strategy not only in former 
SOEs.  And yet, this form of relational contracting presents growing costs and potential 
risks such as, for instance, political pressure for the distribution of higher dividends or 
the request to take on social responsibilities toward the local community (Gelman & 
Lankina, 2008). But something really frightening may also materialize, namely, the risk 
of a combined action by local corrupt authorities and a non-independent judiciary that 
could lead to an expropriation of the enterprise. It is such Russian variant of hostile 
takeover that may help understanding recent trends in the ‘westernization’ of corporate 
governance (Markus, 2008).
In big Russian "rms substantial changes begin to spread in statutory norms, the 
composition of boards, and the protection of minority shareholders’ rights. What 
seems to emerge is that managers and shareholders have increased their alertness to 
state a$itude towards the de"nition of property rights. If that a$itude turns too activist 
or predatory, insiders tend to concede part of the control to outside shareholders in or-
der to create alliances to counteract possible threats of expropriation. !e typical allies 
in this “anti-state insurance” (Markus, 2008, p. 74) are western "nancial agencies whose 
investments risk turning into sunk costs along with all public actors that can transform 
the new legitimacy of "rms that have adopted international standards into lobbying 
pressures. 
Here a paradoxical aspect of the change process becomes apparent: the shiQ towards 
a dirigiste state has positively in#uenced, even if inadvertently, the development of cor-
porate government in Russia (Markus, 2008, p. 86). On this, three conclusions Markus 
draws from his investigation are crucial for understanding the pushes and pulls in the 
co-evolution process. First, economic elites are more likely to reveal their institution 
building capacity when the external allies possess a big political capital and decide to 
use it. Second, the implementation of this capacity, may not be the "rst choice, but may 
be displayed only aQer other strategies (social and unsocial) have proven fruitless. Fi-
nally, what also counts is the perception potential expropriators have of costs and ben-
e"ts of the operation. In fact, the "rst big operation of this kind has demonstrated that, if 
the "rm is strategic and the oligarch has got high political ambitions, the expropriation 
is carried out without hesitation.
Today high priority sectors also include high tech "rms, which, in their turn, have 
to cope with the grip of the administrative regime, which is clearly shown in an investi-
gation on the organization-institution interplay in the microelectronic industry in Ze-
lenograd in the period 1999-2004 (Ahlstrὂm & Bruton, 2010). !e results have been 
presented by the authors with reference to the classic distinction between the three 
institutional pillars - regulative, normative and cognitive. Within the regulative pillar, 
the tax system has become less “unstable and merciless”, "scal regulations have become 
less complex, and the government has designed more supportive policies for start-ups. 
Nonetheless, the normative practice and cognitive acceptance of entrepreneurial "rms 
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is far from being clearly established in society. !us the movement into a grey area be-
tween legality and illegality continues, as an example related to the normative practice 
can demonstrate. 
Today the search for government funds has become very important for these "rms, 
and so has the networking with the state administration and big business. But an un-
pleasant outcome of these relations (sviazy) may materialize in the form of otkat (kick-
back), that is, the money that has been won in the tender has to get back to the o=cial 
who arranged the deal (Ahlstrὂm & Bruton, 2010, p. 543). No wonder that a wide-
spread reaction to this state of a/airs is that of ‘concealment’, which works like this. 
!e "rm tries to associate with a well legitimized organization, such as a non-pro"t or 
state-linked enterprise. When the deal is made, the "rm gets out of sight, but is not in 
the shadow economy: it is in a grey market insofar as it is not registered, does not have 
to pay taxes, and conducts transactions in cash, those with the hosting organization 
included. !is is a rational choice, but only in the short-term, for it places limits to the 
"rm’s growth (Ahlstrὂm & Bruton, 2010, p 541).!is research, however, points to a sig-
ni"cant change in the normative pillar: these entrepreneurs succeeded in introducing 
changes that in#uence the legitimacy of business, and in obtaining more support from 
the government (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010, p. 546).
!e practice of concealment seems quite widespread for the whole population of 
small independent "rms with less than thirty employees whose life seems to be quite 
tormented. Counting all kind of bureaucratic controls, these "rms may well receive 
up to an inspection a day. Police may materialize once every three days (Safavian et 
al., 2001; Byung-Yeon Kim & Youngho Kang, 2009). But playing hide and seek brings 
about a paradox. An intrusive and corrupt bureaucracy pushes many small business-
men to multiply activities and try hard to make them more productive in order to in-
crease earnings. Yet, a good deal of those earnings must be shared with the rent-seekers 
in local institutions. !is is something that recalls the plight of Italian sharecroppers in 
the 1950s that had to sharpen their enterprising spirit, conceal part of the crop and "nd 
auxiliary works to make ends meet with a pie half of which was earmarked for the land-
owners in town. !at also reminds the quasi-enterprises of the soviet shadow economy 
that used to pay a “hush money” to party-cadres turned into local bosses ( Jowi$, 1983; 
Mars & Altman, 1983; Grancelli, 1988). 
To sum up, the research on the environment question shows all the strength of path 
dependency in its cultural and macrostructural features which have been traced back 
to a persistent void of market-supporting institutions and an economy which is not 
beyond the stage of catch up. !e organizational question also points to a set of strik-
ing continuities, especially at the microlevel of shop-#oor whereby soviet-type labour 
relations seem to have been re-enacted especially in former SOEs. Finally, the bridging 
question points to a paradoxical intertwining of both continuities and changes, which, 
including Russia, seems to mark an in#ection point in the co-evolution of institutional 
pressures and organizational practices.
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3. "e co-evolutionary framework: further developments  
on the bridging issue
Possible advances on the issue depend on a be$er theoretical footing of the co-evo-
lutionary perspective whose makings may however be found in the recent literature 
(Hoskisson, 2000; Lewin & Koza, 2001; Uhlenbruck et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2005; 
Meyer & Peng 2006; Suhomlimova, 2006; Soulsby & Clark, 2007; Gelbuda et al., 2008; 
Bruton et al., 2010; Dixon et al., 2010; Pu/er & McCarthy, 2011; Xu & Meyer, 2012).
A good question to start with concerns the ways economic actors standing at the 
cross-roads of institutions absorb and handle complex sets of contradictory institution-
al pressures (Gelbuda et al., 2008). Investigations on how organizations and institutions 
co-evolve depict a set of relationships that are combined e/ects of institution building 
process and the cultural-institutional legacies of a collectivistic society. More precisely, 
they point to the socio-institutional "lters the new market-supporting institutions must 
get through before they can impinge on organizational strategies and structures. Yet, 
such "lters do not work the same way all over the country. 
!e co-evolutionary process is not so linear in Russia: a be$er understanding of 
the twists and turns in the coupling between organizational process and institutional 
pressures may start from two hypotheses. First, a sub-national reproduction of the au-
thoritarian model has certainly taken place in the last decade, but a perfect institutional 
isomorphism is not the outcome: we need to know be$er who is going to "ll the insti-
tutional void, and how, at the meso-level of organizational "elds and local communities. 
Second, there also is a need to be$er clarify what is rarely dealt with in the study of 
business-state relations, namely, the rede"ning of organizational borders and the strate-
gies of organizational actors involved in such a process.
On the organizational issue. An approach still seldom applied in transition econo-
mies is that focused on leadership and organizational learning as microfoundations of 
enterprise dynamic capabilities (Teece, 2007; Helfat et al., 2007). A recent, elaborated 
proposal for the application of a dynamic capabilities approach (DCA) to conditions 
of rapid institutional change has been put forward by Dixon, Meyer and May (2010) 
with the aim of "lling the gap remaining in the literature on the interdependencies 
among di/erent aspects of organizational transformation in transition economies. 
Other scholars, pointing to the limits of top-down transformations, have tried to in-
tegrate resource-based and organizational learning literature to get to an approach 
that may account both for the "rm history, and address the process of adaptation to 
an environment in which competitive advantage has become increasingly important 
(Uhlenbruck et al., 2003). In this respect, there are two advances brought about by the 
DCA according to their proponents. First, it presents an elaboration on the stages of 
organizational change which is absent in previous approaches. Second, it tries to spell 
out the interrelationships among a more complex set of factors at di/erent levels than 
those dealt with in other co-evolutionary frameworks such as, for instance, that of Peng 
(2003).
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Actually, the DCA may help be$er understand di/erent stages of organizational 
change by looking into a dynamism that may go beyond the zero level of “how we earn 
a living now” capabilities to the level in which a process of co-evolution of past-expe-
rience and knowledge articulation sets in (Dixon, 2010, p. 418). In the "rst stage, or-
ganizational change is heavily constrained by the “socialist organizational imprinting” 
(Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006). But in a successive stage a break with a sticky historical 
endowment begins to emerge, and the problem of decoupling members from their old 
routines meets with some success. !e "nal stage is that of changes from the traditional 
pa$erns of ‘transactional’ leadership to forms of ‘transformational’ leadership and or-
ganizational learning that generate research and innovation functions for a competitive 
advantage in an unstable institutional context (Dixon et al., 2010, pp. 422-28).
Dixon, Meyer and May claim they have highlighted the microfoundations of dy-
namic capabilities, and in so doing they have opened the black box of organizational 
change. !is claim is justi"ed in the following terms. “(…) in the advanced stage of 
organizational transformation, the top management team can no longer be the main 
interface of an organization with the environment or the sole arbiter of creativity and 
innovation” (Dixon et al., 2010, p. 438). Yet, what they seem to have in mind is an evolv-
ing transactional leadership within an empowered organization which fosters forms of 
‘intrapreneurship”. !is is perhaps an idea a bit ahead of times in Russia.
!e point here is that opening up the organizational black box is only partial if we 
overlook two phenomena which occur on both the institutional and organizational 
sides of the coupling mechanism. !e "rst has to do with the changing boundaries of 
enterprises in di/erent organizational "elds and socio-territorial environments, which 
are scantly investigated and undertheorized (Suhomlimova, 2006). And the second, 
with the ways the regulative pillar impact on organization is "ltered in a “dual state” 
whereby the principles of constitutional democracy coexist with an administrative re-
gime largely made of informal relations among rent-seekers, factional "ghting and para-
constitutional practices (Sawka, 2010). In Russia (but not just there), the legislation 
frequently has a ‘declaratory’ character (Martin, 2007). Yet, the regulative pillar may 
work di/erently at sub-national level. 
On the environmental question. !e shortcomings of current research have been 
traced to a conception of path dependency as a set of macrovariables which constrain or 
facilitate the strategic adaptation of enterprises. But enterprises are seen as embedded 
solely into an organizational "eld (Lewin & Koza, 2001) and not in di/erent socioin-
stitutional environments.
According to Soulsby and Clark (2007), further advances on the macro-level of 
analysis are related to the capacity to incorporate the state and its agencies as integral 
stakeholders in what has been labelled a “politicized managerial capitalism”. (Martin, 
2002). However, what emerges from the empirical insights presented above is that state 
agencies and policies count, but what also counts is the individual agency of actors in 
the administrative regime along with the oQen ‘malignant’ social capital brought about 
by the concerted action therein. And, "nally, what counts is the impact at sub-national 
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level of outside institutional actors along with that of the gatekeepers that straddle the 
divide between insider and outsider.
!e most signi"cant steps ahead have been made on the bridging question. Here the 
best ways to tackle the micro-macro gap have been detected in historically oriented 
comparisons that may prove of higher heuristic value than agency theory or the re-
source-based view (Bruton et al., 2010) for further re"ning the analysis of strategy and 
corporate governance or of the capacity economic actors have to act as institutional 
entrepreneurs that make changes to match their environment (Child, 2005; Ahlstrὂm 
& Bruton, 2010; Cantwell et al., 2010). 
In these comments on implications for future research, I just brie#y refer to the co-
evolution of entrepreneurial "rms by proposing some comparative remarks on the re-
ciprocal in#uences of micro processes occurring within organizations and meso level 
process in a local environment made of organizational "elds and local communities. 
!is approach is proposed by Olga Suhomlimova that rightly claims its applicability to 
transition economies that display great dynamism in the rede"nition of organizational 
boundaries and the aggregation between organizations such as spin-o/s and divestures 
(Suhomlimova, 1999, 2006). !e meso-level analysis is, in this case, focused on organi-
zational "elds and shows the process of (de-) institutionalization of models of social 
interaction such as structures of control, product strategies, and rules of exchange in a 
given organizational "eld. !e signi"cant step ahead here is that investigating the "elds 
reveals not just an institutional void as a set of institutions at di/erent stages of con-
struction or demolition (Suhomlimova, 2006, p. 1553). 
!e other way to tackle the micro-meso link has been merely hinted to by Suhom-
limova, and implies a shiQ in focus on the relations between the enterprise and the 
local community (or company town). A classic example may be found in Gouldner’s 
Pa&erns of industrial bureaucracy, which has been recently revisited by Hallet and Ven-
tresca (2006), who make a couple of points of interest for a comparative look into the 
Russian case. First, Pa&erns took as its focus industrial bureaucracy when it was a new 
institutional form which was going to frame the “scienti"c management of production” 
aQer the “foreman empire” went to an end in American industry. !e second is that “of-
tentimes, these classic works speak to contemporary debates (if only we would listen)” 
(Hallet & Ventresca, 2006, p. 912). 
Actually, the” indulgency  pa$ern” at the General Gypsum Company (informality, 
laxness with the rules, direct interaction between management and the workers, second 
chances, and some tolerance for the li$le larceny) might be taken, by and large, as a blue-
print for a model quite common in soviet low-priority enterprises. Second, the foreman 
empire is partly reproducing itself in post-soviet factories, especially in former SOEs. 
!ird, it is within the foreman empire that, paradoxically, a social construction of markets 
may unfold and may also be investigated  if our radars are able to spot how individual 
agency and agency relationships unfold in workplaces, communities and company towns.
In the gypsum mine, the rule-centred bureaucracy the new director tried to impose 
was met by tacit resistance and latent con#icts that turned it in a new variant of ‘mock’ 
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bureaucracy. !e shop-#oor accounts on post-soviet factories show that at least part of 
the previous pa$ern of indulgency is now dressed in new bureaucratic clothing. In the 
post-soviet factory regime, external pressures for a tighter coupling between new pat-
terns of authority and everyday work practices  is, with some exceptions, far from being 
established. !e reaction of workers to this tightening of coupling has been described 
by Clarke in terms quite similar to those described by Gouldner. But the evidence on 
the co-evolution model in transition economy also reveals another similarity with what 
happened in the gypsum mine: some aspects of the work organization may be more 
or less tightly coupled according to the degree of convergence between the interests of 
management and the workers.
However, what the research streams referred to above tend to overlook is that a new 
representative bureaucracy can be re-established in another organizational context cre-
ated by managers and workers who founded a new smaller enterprise in the local com-
munity or company town. Future research should elaborate further on the meso-level 
approaches that highlight the changing of organizational borders and the new aggrega-
tion between enterprises especially in context whereby local/regional institutions cre-
ate favourable conditions for the development of SMEs and something like a “free en-
trepreneurship” (Yakovlev, 2011). !e !ird Italy of industrial clusters, non ‘malignant’ 
social capital and (relatively) good local governments, may indeed be a comparator that 
highlights the potential for development of meso-level approaches to the co-evolution 
processes.
4. Emerging entrepreneurship and local processes:  
more on bridging the micro-macro gap
In concluding their a$empt to probe theoretically in Eastern Europe, Meyer and Peng 
(2006) note that most institutional comparative analysis involves the USA or China, 
and asked “Why not Italy and France?” since these are countries in which both SOEs 
and personal networks are important. Having gained a certain amount of local knowl-
edge, I shall put forward some thoughts on Italy as a possible comparator for the Rus-
sian case. 
Italy has been labelled as a “particular system of corporatism” which, contrary to 
what happens in the liberal/individualistic system of the USA, is not dominated by the 
idea of the autonomy of local actors, but by a logic in which corporatist associations 
make their requests to politics without any concerns about a possible socialisation of 
the interests they defend ( Jepperson & Meyer, 2000).
!e Italian case (along with that of Japan) in the period between the late 1940s and 
the early 1990s was used by Hanson & Teague (2005) for comparison between Italy 
then and Russia in the early 2000s. In fact, the two authors depict the case as one of 
corrupt cronyism, single ‘party of power’, extended economic role of the state, and eco-
nomic success. Like Russia, Italy is ranked as a ‘low-trust society’, whereby strong fam-
ily ties are coupled with an equally strong distrust of unrelated members of the wider 
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community and, in particular, of the state and its laws. !e concept of “amoral familism” 
used to depict the society in southern Italy is very similar to that of ‘small-group solidar-
ity’ used to describe Russian social networks. Also typical of the case in point are weak 
intermediate institutions that in high-trust societies mediate between individuals and 
the state. 
According to Hanson and Teague, all this has obvious implications for business-
state relations: in Italy private sector "rms tend to be relatively small and family con-
trolled, while large-scale enterprises need the support of the state to be viable. In short, 
for most of the period, there was a pervasive network of patron-client relationships, 
spanning government, parties and business. However, the private sector’s interest in a 
small state and deregulation developed over time, and seems to have had much to do 
with the growing internationalisation of the economy. !us, much of the vigour that 
distinguished the economy in its boom periods came from small and medium "rms 
that were outside the networks in question.
Hanson and Teague do not explore this “!ird Italy” of SMEs, industrial clusters 
and proactive local governments, and so they miss something of growing importance, 
namely, the relationship at sub-national level between institutions and new econom-
ic actors. A stylized account of this sub-national economic take-o/ (Bagnasco, 1977, 
1988) is then in order for a historically oriented comparison in which new entrepre-
neurial "rms are contextualized in their socio-territorial context, and not only in their 
organizational "eld.
r 5SBOTGPSNBUJPOPGBOFYUFOEFEQFBTBOUGBNJMZUIBUDBOFBTJMZUVSOJOUPBTNBMM
business unit because  its members oQen had former experiences of  small farms 
tenancy as owners or sharecroppers, but also experiences of auxiliary works out-
side agriculture or of factory work acquired through emigration abroad or into 
the Italian “Industrial triangle” (Milan-Turin-Genoa);              
r &OUSFQSFOFVSTIJQXJUIIJTUPSJDBMSPPUT JOUPXOTXJUIBDPTNPQPMJUBOUSBEJUJPO
which became again a resource when the expansion of market demand made 
crucial anew both the earlier capacities of handicraQ and small industry along 
with the habit of doing with international markets and "nance;     
r -BDLPGTUBUFJOUFSWFOUJPOBDDPNQBOJFECZBEFGBDUPMFOJFOUėTDBMQPMJDZNBEFPG
scarce administrative control;
r 8JEFTQSFBEQBĨFSOTPGHPPEMPDBMHPWFSONFOUTXJUIQPTJUJWFPVUDPNFTPOTP-
cial integration and economic growth;
r 5SBEJUJPOT PG DJWJDOFTT HFOFSBMJ[FE USVTU BOE IPNPHFOFPVT QPMJUJDBM DVMUVSFT
(red in the centre and white in the north-east);
r *ODSFBTJOHMBCPVSDPTUTBOESJHJEJUZPGXPSLPSHBOJ[BUJPOJONFEJVNTJ[FEBOE
big factories brought about by widespread labour unrests that prompt a reaction 
by industrialists in terms of subcontracting part of the production cycle to new 
e=cient microenterprises started up by former skilled workers and foremen.
In short, local governments in the !ird Italy “seem to have extended and modern-
ized a set of family and community functions for a social construction of the market (em-
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phasis added), that is, a set of institutional arrangements that put cultural heritage and 
political action to use for pa$erns of economic development regulated by the market 
but also socially underpinned, and consistent with a collective identity” (Bagnasco, 
1988, p. 64).Taking this generalization as the starting point, I try to sketch a look into 
the Russian case through Italian lens for I surmise that despite all the di/erences some 
potential for a social construction of markets does exist within and outside the” bas-
tions of conservatism”.
In their paper on strategy in emerging economies, Xu and Meyer (2012) include the 
“bo$om of the pyramid” among the phenomena to be subject to further investigation, 
that is to say, the antecedents of development even in the less developed regions in tran-
sitional societies. Actually, the antecedents of organizational capacities for change may 
be found even in the less developed and peripheral regions of Russia. For instance, one 
may see that the initial privatization without marketization of a kolkhoz  may later on 
generate spin o/s of the more productive components promoted by part of the manag-
ers in agreement with the most skilled workers and technical cadres. And one may also 
see a shiQ from the old state of a/airs in which “a li$le larceny can do a lot to improve 
employees’ moral” to a new one in which some enterprising spirit begins to spread in 
family farming (Grancelli, 2011).
!en, there is the case of Novgorod city and region, which highlights a transforma-
tion process partially similar to those which started out two decades earlier in the !ird 
Italy. First, an industrial policy which prioritised the closing down or restructuring of 
uncompetitive enterprises, accompanied by a set of measures to a$ract FDIs. Second, 
a local society characterized by forms of civicness and social capital useful to economic 
development that, along with the institutional endorsement to civic initiatives, brought 
about greater e=ciency in the distribution of resource, and a greater community ‘own-
ership’ of welfare programs. Finally, an increased level of generalized trust that encour-
aged cooperation among local elites thus reducing, “the rapaciousness of groups that 
might otherwise engage in destructive in-"ghting or take advantage of their position 
to enrich themselves at the expenses of the community” (Petro, 2001, p. 237). It seems 
that the policies summarized above keep being part, by and large, of the local political 
agenda in Nizhny Novgorod. !at kind of changeover does not seem to be the typi-
cal one though. As it emerges from some recent regional studies, the most widespread 
model may be de"ned as “sub-national authoritarianism” (Gelman & Ryzhenkov, 
2011). But why not trying to spot, with a “bias for hope” (Hirschman, 1971), the latent 
resources that may be put into e/ect for societal modernization and development?
!is comparative look into the Russian case provides support to the rightness of 
two insights for the advancement of co-evolutionary perspective one may "nd in re-
cent contributions. First, due a$ention should be paid to cultures, legal systems, incen-
tives, all framed within be$er historically oriented perspectives (Bruton, Ahlstrὂm & 
Obloj, 2008; Ahlstrὂm & Bruton, 2010; Bruton, Ahlstrὂm & Han-Lin, 2010). Change 
in strategic choices and organizational forms can be be$er understood by introduc-
ing relevant time scales more than through elaborations of cross-sectional data that do 
 39
not allow comparing the in#ection points that emerge in a given temporal bracketing 
(Peng, 2003). Second, incumbent "rms and new entrepreneurial ventures should be 
framed both within organizational "elds and socio-territorial contexts with the peculi-
arities of their economic history and their transformation paths (Suhomlimova, 2006; 
Welter, 2010).
In the next section, I put forward some preliminary remarks that emerge from the 
comparative look into the social construction of markets sketched above, and may be in-
cluded in the general issue of “embeddedness and beyond” (Brinton & Nee, 1998, Ch. 2). 
On high-context approaches and the rationality of economic actors:  
concluding remarks
!e issues that need to be tackled to bridge the micro-macro gap require thick descrip-
tions, high-context approaches and historically oriented comparisons. Does this imply 
that the micro-meso link is to be addressed solely by focusing on organizational "elds 
whereby only collective action seems to unfold?
!ick descriptions of societal systems of capitalism have been carried out with two 
aims: to highlight the sources of the “national comparative advantage” (Hall & Soskice, 
2001) and to explain the reasons of convergence/divergence of national socio-institu-
tional systems that are categorized in terms of “social system of production” (Holligs-
worth & Boyer, 1998) or “societal market orders” (Fligstein, 2001). !ese high-context 
approaches stand against the low-context economic ones that allegedly have failed to 
specify, for instance, the ways in which di/erent organizational pa$erns arise in re-
sponse to the same competitive pressure or have given scant a$ention to the variety of 
goals or risk preferences in dominant coalitions (Redding, 2005, p. 124). 
!e typical high-context socio-economic approach is oQen applied to the study of 
organizations cross-nationally. An example is provided by John Child (2000), who uses 
the concept of ‘rationale’ as a combination of formal rationality, carried out in the sys-
tem of material imperatives, and substantive rationality that instead pertains to the idea-
tional systems of culture and social norms. !us, high-context approach includes cul-
tural and institutional theory while the low-context one is exempli"ed by psychological 
or economic universalism, technology-based theory and methodological individualism 
(Reddding, 2005, p. 126). 
!ick descriptions and high context approaches tend to make the point that insti-
tutional constraints are means for counteracting forms of self-interest seeking that may 
lead rational individuals to destroy productive resources in the pursuit of short-term 
gains (Streeck, 1992). Yet, the unresolved issue here appears to be that the endorse-
ment of densely organized capitalism fails to address the organizational dilemma of 
trust versus predation. In other words, networks, associations and other communitar-
ian institutions do not necessarily generate #exibility and competitive success. !ey 
may also bring about predation and rent-seeking practices, monopoly and collective 
opportunism (Schneiber, 2001, p. 175).
40 
Be that as it may, future advances in understanding rational action  in context may 
certainly start from an enlarged conception of institutionalism such as that proposed by 
Ronald Jepperson who claims that institutional constraints can also be addressed within 
a rational choice perspective in relation to opportunity costs ( Jepperson, 2000). Prob-
ably the time has come to address the coupling mechanisms between organizational 
practices and institutional pressures as the outcome of “reasonable or understandable 
actions”, that is, actions that are supposed to be rational given the context within which 
actors move. And this amounts to saying that any observer who knows that context 
may say: I could have acted the same way if I had been in the same situation (Boudon, 
1987, 58). Actually, from an enlarged institutional platform we might begin to pay some 
a$ention to agency and agency relationships that emerge from contributions of the in-
dividualistic tradition in sociology.
To conclude, if we have to tackle organizational change in the context of radical in-
stitutional shiQ, we may well realize that rational-reasonable actors act in ways that are 
all too oQen overlooked by socio-economic approaches that still have not developed a 
theory of individual motivations to act within or without a network or a community 
(Chajewski, 2007, p. 24). And those actors may be found not solely in top management 
teams. In other words, working people, that usually are rational-reasonable actors, may 
rede"ne previous agency relationships with their collective representations, as it hap-
pened in Poland in the 1990s (Chajewski, 2007). But they may even go beyond that in 
retrieving their agentic prerogatives and change status: id est, from trade-unionists to 
small entrepreneurs that started up as subcontractors of incumbent "rms. !ese strate-
gies of independence were a common occurrence in the 1970s all over Italian industrial 
districts. It was a mushrooming of small entrepreneurial ventures which would go un-
noticed for long behind the coverage of industrial unrests and the institutional façade 
of neocorporatist intermediation. 
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